Not Quite Abled and Not Quite Disabled: Experiences of Being "In Between" - ME and The Academy by Moss, Pamela
Not Quite Abled and Not Quite Disabled: 
Experiences of Being "In Between" -
ME and The Academy 
Pamela Moss 
University of Victoria 
ME and the Academy 
I fell ill several years ago and three physicians wrote letters to support my illness. 1 
The diagnosis was Myalgic encephalomyelitis, or ME (popularly known as Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome or CFS). ME is a disease of the central nervous system with an indefinite aetiolo-
gy. Symptoms include pain, fatigue, and cognitive impairment and the course of the disease 
progress is unpredictable. Recovery rates vary with a full recovery estimated at less than 
three per cent. The disease predominantly affects women. 
I was not sure how to arrange my life academically so that I could be ill and get 
tenure so that I could keep my job. My job as a faculty member both permitted me to have 
time to be ill and circumscribed the range of choices I had for recovery. Initially, I went on 
short term sick leave. As part of the agreement for getting sick time off during the term, I had 
to prepare the rest of my lectures for the term and put together my reappointment dossier. I 
also chose to stay in contact with some graduate students and to continue organizing an inter-
national conference about feminist praxis. In exchange the university paid me while I was 
sick and agreed not to contact me at home on routine matters. With this agreement in hand 
and my work for the term complete, I went home to collapse completely. 
Several months later, still with severe symptoms (what was I thinking?), I returned 
to the university on a reduced workload, one that, again, I had to negotiate with the adminis-
tration. There was no policy that dealt specifically with chronic illness. Short term sick leave, 
for up to six months, applies primarily to acute illness and increasingly to situations for 
stress, both with relatively short recovery periods. The long term disability policy relates to 
injuries and illness thatfi1lly prevent someone from completing their work tasks for long 
periods of time. The very idea that I could do some of the work tasks, but not all of them and 
that I could complete most of my work tasks, but not during specified times or in designated 
spaces, seemed to be outside the purview of policy and the experience of university adminis-
trators. With my short term sick leave used up, I considered long term disability benefits 
(LTD). But, because I had not been completely off work the six months prior to applying for 
benefits, I had to negotiate my re-entry into the academy on an individual basis.2 
These sets of experiences - the withdrawal from the academy, the negotiation of 
terms to return full-time to the academy, and the period between these two events - led me to 
think through how being in between ability and disability, in between health and illness, in 
between employed and unemployed restructured the ways I related to pursuing a career as a 
faculty member in the academy. Although I reacted immediately to this restructuring, only 
now am I beginning to figure out why and how I responded. My ongoing readings in femi-
nism and poststructural theory continually frame and re-frame my experiences and enhance 
my fascination with what is between ME and the academy (e.g. Diprose 1994; Davis 1997; 
Thomas 1999). 
In the first half of this paper, I explore how to think about spaces in between ability 
and disability. In the second half, I provide an analysis of some of my own experiences 
between ME and the academy. I close with comments on how to frame workplace accommo-
dation strategies and actions that could incorporate the uncertainty and ambiguity of a chron-
ic illness like ME. ' 
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In Between Spaces 
Within the academy, faculty members3 with chronic illness could be said to fall 
between the cracks. We have to recover in six months, or not recover at all. We have to work 
completely or not to work at all. We have to be fully abled or fully disabled. To fall between 
the cracks really means that there is no category for a person with chronic illness to fit in. We 
are neither fully abled nor fully disabled. We could be described as both partially abled and 
partially disabled. But most often we are cast as not quite abled and not quite disabled, some-
where in between the distinguishable spaces of ability and disability. "Falling between the 
cracks" reminds me of the extent to which academic institutions are ensconced in binary 
thinking. Once designated as "between the cracks," there is nothing more for the institution 
to do except- to negotiate terms of employment individually. 
Yet there is no other place to be with chronic illness, except to exist between those 
cracks. (And, oh, how those cracks are contoured!) One of the conceptual difficulties arising 
out of this crude categorization is the non-recognition that there is anything between one cat-
egory and another, between an absence or a presence, between nothing and something. That 
there is nothing- the "between the cracks" - is indeed something in between spaces! Ifwe 
understand being in between spaces as something or somewhere, then being there might mat-
ter to who we are. If so, then theories of difference can be useful in figuring out how to link 
in between spaces with other types of spaces and to think about how we adjust to living in 
between spaces, as not quite abled and not quite disabled. 
Mouffe (1995) uses Derrida's concept of"constitutive outside" to explain the rela-
tionship between self and other. Two basic premises underlying the notion of the "constitu-
tive outside" are: (I) any identity of a "we" is based on excluding some "other" and (2) sub-
ject positions are constituted through sets of social relations. When thinking about how dif-
ference is (re)produced, Mouffe points out that within the same identity of"I" there is always 
some remnant of that which is being excluded, even if it is only its absence. Thus, while 
identities are being constituted, there is already an inclusion in some form of the "outside." 
In this way, no person can attain a complete, permanent, singular identity for there is always 
already present some "other." For example, when defining a person with ME as disabled, 
there is already implicated in that identity the notion of ability. Similarly, in defining a person 
with ME as able-bodied, being disabled is excluded. 
Mouffe goes on to argue that because identities are constituted, there is no specific 
identity that is not open to challenge because there is no self-referential point that is outside 
the process of constituting difference. In this sense, persons with disabilities are able-bodied 
in some ways just as able-bodied people are disabled in other ways. In the context of linking 
identities or creating a "we," this non-specificity of identity means that there is no definitive 
or predetermined link to or with other people (Mouffe 1992). Any connection is partial and 
in flux. This, however, does not mean that we cannot be part of a collective identity or a 
group of people with ME. Mouffe (1992) uses the term nodal point to describe temporary 
fixations around which identities coalesce. Nodal points result from hegemonic processes 
through which identities come to be conceived as tightly defined, fixed, and natural. 
Disrupting these nodal points can help in transforming identities from a static, politically 
immobile set of associations to a dynamic, politically mobilizing set. 
Mouffe's theory of differentiating identities is useful in understanding being in 
between spaces while living with chronic illness. She says that even though identities are 
fluctuating, indeterminate, and conditional, they can become fixed through the ways power is 
deployed in society. So, even though ME is a contingent identity for anyone (because even 
among persons with ME, identities are not unitary or monolithic), we still take on the fixed 
identity of being "not quite ab led and not quite disabled." For understanding ME, what might 
be useful is unravelling the processes that constitute a particular nodal point - de-linking the 
identity of ME as neither abled nor disabled - and re-activating it - constituting ME as an 
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identity that is both abled and disabled. Rather than differentiating a disabled body from an 
abled body, we can embrace oppositional binaries that move us counter hegemonically 
toward a new way of defining ourselves as a body that is abled and disabled at the same 
time. 
Volatility Within In Between Spaees 
This explanation of how identities form aids in articulating how we can be active 
in rethinking identities in a way that more closely corresponds to experiences of chronic ill-
ness. Because the basis of identity is conditional on numerous sets of interactive social rela-
tions, individual and singular experiences are not excluded within a collective identity. They 
are also not the defining element of a particular identity, as for example, in what can or can-
not constitute what it is to be abled or disabled. The identities themselves become volatile 
volatile in the sense of being ever changing, unpredictable, fluctuating (after Grosz 1994). 
Such volatility opens up multiple ways to think about how illness and ability connect. 
What poses problems in the academy is that this volatility as part of in between 
spaees is not part of the way administrators approach faculty members who have chronic ill-
ness. Volatility from the institution's point of view translates into unreliability, capricious-
ness. This has an added dimension in that an institution based on serious thinking cannot be 
expected to support a superficial, frivolous, erratic academic who is unable (used deliberately 
in this context) to think seriously. Any set of accommodating arrangements is routinely char-
acterized as "self-serving" and preferential for the person with chronic illness. As a result, 
any success that an individual with chronic illness achieves is not her own. Success can only 
be attributed to the advantageous situation that a person with chronic illness was able to 
negotiate individually, often interpreted as at the expense of her colleagues. 
In order to illustrate how Mouffe's thoughts about how identity forms play out 
through divergent views of volatility, I draw on three experiences of engaging with adminis-
trators in my university over negotiating spaces in between ME and the academy. 
Negotiating Illness 
One of the most common misunderstandings about ME within the academy among 
faculty members is that ME is not all that serious an illness. The message we get over and 
over again is the "quicherbitchin4 and get on with it" or the "after all we're all tired" attitude. 
So it really came as no surprise that when I went to the Chair and told him that I would have 
to go on sick leave immediately, he expected me to prepare for being ill. Illness and the 
inability to work are associated (hegemonically) with more acceptable illnesses from which 
one eventually recovers, as for example, acute illness, hospital stays, and some mental ill-
ness. These associations form a specific nodal point that over time has been naturalized 
serious illness is the only reason not to be able to work. By implication, any illness that is 
not serious cannot be a legitimate enough reason to be off work.Thus, requesting sick leave 
because of ME throws into turmoil the existing taken-for-grantedness of the link between ill-
ness and the ability to work. More pointedly, the legitimacy of being ill is being challenged, 
a challenge with dire material consequences. 
Because chronic illness is a non-category and not part of the "naturalness" of the 
experience ofbeing on sick leave, administrators expected me to "plan" for being ill. Before 
I was permitted to be sick institutionally, I had to complete a specific set of work tasks, ones 
that would have never been ~xpected from someone who just had a heart attack. 5 I was 
forced into a "negotiation of illness" because I am not part of the pre-existing categorization 
ofpeople who are ill and can be off work. Because I "fell between the cracks," I had to do 
more work at a critical time of my illness in order to make my leave based on sickness 
acceptable and legitimate. 
This negotiation of illness also provides an example of the way in which volatility 
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is used against a volatile body. Chronic illness, generally, and ME, specifically, are not con-
ventionally accepted as serious illness, although some chronic illness is more acceptable. 6 
My ability to go to school and announce my illness to administrators suggested that I was 
able to work, but preferred not to. The unpredictability of ME did not permit me to make a 
public to-do over my collapse. By not embracing volatility.and the way it works, the admin-
istrators in the university could only slot me into pre-determined, fixed categories - if I could 
work, I was.not sick; ifI were sick, I could not work. So, when I completed the tasks that 
were demanded of me, the administrators called my ill identity into question precisely 
because I was able to complete the tasks! 
Long-term Disability Insurance Benefits 
For two years, beginning Spring 1996, I negotiated a workload with a reduction in 
teaching and administration.7 Near the end of the two year period, administrators told me 
that I had to apply for long-term disability benefits. LTD policies, as administered by benefits 
analysts, have excessively narrow definitions of disability in the context of chronic illness. 
Key is the requirement that a person has not completed any work task at all in the prior six 
months. If so, then s/he is disqualified for benefits. With some companies, partial claims are 
possible. In my case, a representative of the university advised me to apply for full benefits. 
What is at issue here in this example is the inflexibility of categories of identity 
and the insistence of the university to apply for LTD. First, LTD has only two identity cate-
gories - abled and disabled, with nothing in between. Designation by an LTD analyst of a 
employee as only either abled or disabled does not permit an identity other than a "natural-
ized" category of(dis)ability. This designation also denies alternative forms of work expres-
sions and imposes a specific model of a worker. Such a categorization is based on the notion 
that ability implies an exactness of time and space to accomplish specified work tasks. 
Other modes of working are ignored. For example, the complexity and volatility of 
living and working with ME refashions what it means to be exact. Lectures, meetings, and 
office hours often depend on a physical presence. Yet for persons with ME, a physical pres-
ence in a location other than home may means that afterwards there is a two day bed-ridden 
recovery period. Throughout the period between taking sick leave and returning to work full-
time, I had been able to restructure the way I work so that I could do a wide range of tasks in 
ways that did not exhaust me, did not demand my physical presence, and did not require me 
to spend excessive amounts of time interacting. I clearly experienced work time and space 
quite differently than my colleague next door. Yet policy-wise, this was not a possibility. I 
could only exist in between the categories of ab led and disabled because of the inflexibility 
of the workload for a faculty member in a university. 
Second, the university administrators knew that I had been working part-time for 
the preceding two years and still insisted that I apply for full LTD benefits. Knowing that I 
would not fit into the disability category, university administrators set me up to fail the 
examination while at the same time being justified to demand my return to work as a full 
time faculty member. They drew their credibility from the internal consistency with their 
own set of criteria for figuring out how to determine what it means to be disabled - depend-
ing on parameters set by an insurance company. The refusal of my claim by the LTD insur-
ance company legitimated their assertion that I was abled-bodied which further ensconced 
the nodal point where only certain types of illness could be identified with the inability to 
work. This manoeuvre separated my corporeal body from its possible categories, denied my 
volatility, and set me up as an able-bodied worker who was, institutionally, no longer ill. · 
Re-Entry Into "Full Time" Employment 
Once the benefits analyst from the insurance company refused my application for 
LTD, university administrators used this opportunity to declare the institution's position with 
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regard to what is health and what is (legitimate) illness. I raised the possibility of making a 
partial disability claim because of my disqualification. Administrators countered with the 
declaration that all such arrangements had been made only when the person was found to be 
fully unfit to work at all. Whether this is the case or not is not the point. The point is that the 
one policy that could possibly incorporate chronic illness into a reasonably fair accommoda-
tion package sets out - from the beginning - to differentiate partial and full disability bene-
fits on the same terms - only for the fully disabled! 
This exclusion of chronic illness, particularly those marginalized within the criteria 
set up within the LTD insurance structure, permits university administrators to assign institu-
tional labels to employees. For me this piayed out in two interrelated ways. 
First, because of the fixed definitions of ability to work, individuals who are in nei-
ther one category or another become subject to varying social inscriptions of chronic illness 
including such derogatory labels as hypochondria, hysteria, and "something in her head." In 
my case, another implication was that I was not a "team player." My unpredictability disrupt-
ed my workplace because planning for my illness and taking sick time from the institution's 
viewpoint are based on an either/or situation - either sick or well, either abled or disabled -
and not from a position where an individual can be both - both sickand well, both abled and 
disabled. Ifl were a "team player," then I would take up my full load; I would no longer be 
ill; I would join the ranks of predictability. The administration's view was that I was playing 
the system to my own benefit - being able to get full pay on a reduced workload - and not 
being fair to my co-workers. There was no acknowledgement that I exist in between spaces; 
no recognition that my identity as "not quite abled and not quite disabled" would never be 
legitimate. 
Second, because individuals do not fit neatly into categories created by authority 
figures in health fields, university administrators tend to blame the individual with chronic 
illness for systemic problems. In my case, this blame spawned the notion that I was neither 
good at being ill, nor good at being healthy. If I were good at either, then the administration 
could more easily "settle" my case. Being sometimes ill and sometimes healthy poses dilem-
mas for workload issues - paramount in the academy - that the administration is reluctant to 
resolve for fear of setting a precedent. Equality, (supposedly) the basis upon which workload 
tasks are assigned, is difficult to achieve when someone cannot perform work tasks in the 
predictable manner. There is a presumption that one can not be "equal" with a restructured 
workload, one that is designed with an individual with chronic illness so that tasks are 
achievable bits in both time (deadlines, schedules) and space (location, presence). 
Together these institutional labels shaped the way I re-entered the academy "full-
time." At the same meeting with the discussion about the refusal of LTD which included the 
declaration of the definition of health and illness, university administrators were adamant 
about classifying me as full-time prior to my research leave in Summer, 1998. The argument 
the administrators presented at that time was that they would like to see me get full sabbati-
cal pay. Obviously, this was surprising given that we had been discussing full-time status 
with regard to specific work tasks. Bearing in mind this discussion, which was immediately 
prior to the suggestion, I countered with declaring my status full-time from the end of term 
onward. I argued that because my work tasks would not change significantly between then 
and the day my research leave would begin, I would prefer that my status be full-time on the 
basis of workload and not salary considerations. 
This experience demonstrates how easily full-time status can be de-linked from a 
faculty member's ill identity with workload implications and re-sorted into a financial cate-
gory for administrative ease. Once it was clear that I fell between the cracks financially, uni-
versity administrators needed some justification to push me up one side of the chasm into a 
distinguishable space - one of full-time status, through which I could instantaneously trans-
form into being "fully-abled." There was need no more to think about restructuring a work-
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load to accommodate a partially abled, partially disabled body. They could forget about me 
as a "problem" and desist from blaming me for not "fitting in." The implication with full-
time status was that I could finally be good at doing something, being healthy institutionally. 
Framing Strategies Toward Accommodation 
A fundamental question arising from this narrative is: if we can find a way theoret-
ically to re-constitute an identity in between the spaces of ability and disability as being both 
abled and disabled, then how can we politically mobilize this reconstituted identity as a site 
of praxis in the academy? My problematization of this specific set of experiences I have had 
in the academy indicates that the difficulty in mobilizing reconstituted identities lies not in 
the re-constitutive process, but rather in the mobilization of a particular re-constituted identi-
ty - that of "not quite ab led and not quite disabled." For a collective praxis, one that chal-
lenges the institutional convenience of negotiating illness individually, activists in the acade-
. my could usefully frame strategies toward accommodation in volatile terms. 
If the connection between being ill and being able is fleeting, then chronic illness 
can be re-defined as within the realm of the expected. Volatility can become more routine; 
not in the sense of predictability, but in the sense of being expected as a possibility. In order 
to get to a place of accepting chronic illness in its own pattern of fluctuation, accommodation 
strategies need to be flexible. This flexibility has to be in terms of the chronic illness itself as 
well as the variability in disease activity. Various types of chronic illness manifest differently; 
therefore, the specificity of accommodation strategies must look different. Episodic flare-ups 
with Rheumatoid Arthritis need to be accommodated differently than the ongoing managed 
chronicity of Lupus. For persons with ME, disclosure may not be a viable strategy because 
of the negative associations with the illness. However, with diabetes, heightened awareness 
can be necessary for survival. For persons with Multiple Sclerosis, it may be easier to get a 
wrist support for the computer or full-spectrum overhead lighting than a home computer or 
equipment to lecture over closed-circuit television, even though all may be necessary for the 
faculty member to accomplish her tasks. 
Accommodation strategies also need to be re-defined such that there is less a sense 
of a norm against which a person with chronic illness is measured and more a notion of equi-
table access to the work involved with a faculty position. In this way, academic activists can 
more effectively dispel the association of accommodation with being the route to "E-Z 
street." Granted, much policy within disability accommodation is rooted in these terms. What 
is missing is the connection to volatility. Embracing volatility in policy opens up possibilities 
for re-framing accommodation as a process of enabling an environment such that the range 
of tasks associated with a particular job can be completed not only within the distinguishable 
spaces of ability and disability, but also in between spaces. Re-constituting identities through 
taking up the concept of volatility can only enhance the capacities of persons with chronic 
illness in a world that values "health" and "ability." 
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Endnotes 
· 1. For the institution, two physicians had to provide information to support the 
request for sick leave. I obtained a third because only one had provided a diagnosis. 
2. Although the university would cite this as "individual" negotiations, my case 
was far from being an individual effort. Lawyers, healthcare professionals, and on-campus 
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advocates assisted me in my negotiations by providing documentation, advice, and support. I 
thank them all, especially Judith. 
3. I prefer to limit my discussion to faulty members within the university. I know 
that persons with chronic illness, including ME, face similar situations especially when it 
comes to dealing with institutions. However, the points I want to make may be specific to 
white female faculty members and may only be extrapolated to other persons with ME in 
other employment positions through problematizing experience in ~ays that deal critically 
with insights gained from having chronic illness including ME and being employed in the 
academy. 
4. This has particular gendered implications because it is women who bitch and 
complain, not men. 
5. I am not saying that chronic illness is more important than acute illness. I am . 
also not saying that people who have just had heart attacks should be "planning" to be ill. 
The issue is about legitimacy and processing authority. 
6. For example, diabetes, arthritis, and heart disease as chronic illness are much 
more socially and biomedically accepted than ME. • 
7. Systemic harassment against women and feminists in my work environment 
complicated my return to the university. I do not think that I would have been as "ill" as I 
was in 1995 if I had been in a non-hostile work environment. Nor do I think that I would be 
as "healthy" as I am now ifl would have been forced (institutionally) to return to that envi-
ronment. I know that I am doing injustice to the intricate connections among illness and · 
work environments in this text primarily because I have yet to work through those particular 
connections in the context of theories of difference and identity and of body politics. 
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